Pakistan’s attempt to exact token reprisal for the Salala Attacks did not culminate in the sought after apology from the US nor did it halt drone strikes past a month. It might have been perceived by our top echelons as an opportunity to re-draw our lines of engagement, and the political claptrap surrounding the Parliamentary Committee for National Security (PCNS) debates must have bolstered this stance. Difai Pakistan took to the streets clad in martial-rightwing chainmail issuing dire warnings in case of resumption of the supply route, and Khar went on to declare the two countries as strategic partners not allies.

But all good things come to an end; the ephemeral excuse of national interest could not hold ground for long in this case. So when the DCC (Defense Committee of the Cabinet) got on board the G-LOCS (Ground Lines of Communication), the early dissenters quietly returned to their camps. With promises of commission ‘up to’ a million dollars a day, the government began selling the newly negotiated terms as a strategic win to save face.

The US has asked Pakistan to provide security for trucks en route to Afghanistan. Security for NATO supplies had hitherto been provided by private contractors; the trucks would still get looted, providing Taliban with a steady supply of weapons and ammunition. A thriving black market selling items from computers to American flags was in the process of shutting down since supplies in the last six months had dwindled. So now Pakistan has been asked to deal with this issue of targeted pilfering.

If the Pakistani government agrees to this demand, then the small increase in price negotiated with the US comes to naught. Firstly the logistical costs of fuel, setting up bases and transferring say, the FC or Army troops there would cancel out any gains to be made from this newly drafted deal. If this doesn’t involve chalking out a completely different assignment for the Army or FC, then it would materialize in the form of costs involving training a national guard for the supply route.

Secondly, Pakistani forces, or paramilitary posted along the Pak-Afghan border automatically become easy targets for Taliban and exercises for terrorists. To arm them to the teeth would require massive funds and even then the beauty of asymmetric warfare favors the Taliban. Pakistan is looking at bleak possibilities of immense loss of life, livelihood and reparations if it agrees to provide security along the border.

This Faustian bargain was inevitable, even warranted. However the new terms of engagement must be drawn with extreme caution. Pakistan shouldn’t have to be the one apologizing for the Salala Attack by signing a regressive deal.

If there is to be a viable way forward in Afghanistan — one that can reconcile on-the-ground developments with American timelines for withdrawal — Washington has to start talking about tradeoffs. Both President Barack Obama and U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker have publicly assured Afghans that the United States will not repeat the mistakes of the 1990s, when the world left the country to its own devices. The result, of course, was civil war and Taliban rule. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has vowed to Afghan women, “We will not abandon you.” Washington has also agreed to continue economic and social assistance to help make Afghanistan’s gains “self-sustaining” past the U.S. withdrawal in 2014.

But no one works under the illusion that U.S. forces would re-enter Afghanistan to protect women’s rights. And the president is already framing investing in Afghanistan as a tradeoff with “nation building at home,” which makes it difficult to envision sustained, long-term funding for programs in Afghanistan that create jobs and keep children in school.

Yet tradeoffs were absent from the president’s address from Bagram Air Base on May 1. The administration must come clean about what international forces can and can’t execute before world leaders assemble later this month at the NATO summit in Chicago to discuss the future of Afghanistan. If this gathering is to be more than an exchange of lofty speeches and question-riddled commitments, it is time to take a hard and realistic look at the promises that the United States and others are making to Afghanistan — and whether they are too big to keep.

In the Presidential Palace in Central Kabul last week, Obama sat down with Afghan President Hamid Karzai to sign a strategic partnership agreement between Afghanistan and the United States, establishing a road map for the future. In it, Obama affirmed the United States’ commitment to direct financial support to Afghanistan’s economic development. But whether the U.S. Congress will continue to underwrite such funding is far from certain, since dollars will have to be approved each year through the traditional congressional appropriations process. Presumably there will be no funding workaround possible, since Overseas Contingency Operations funding will likely end in 2014. To add insult to injury, many, including several people in the President’s own party, have already turned away — in 2010, more than 100 House Democrats voted against funding the war in Afghanistan. And the Iraq example shows what happens when fatigue is high and the spotlight is off: in both Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, Congress halved the money requested for Iraqi police training.

In the United States, the war’s popularity has fallen steadily since Obama entered office, reaching a nadir in April, when only 30 percent of Americans polled said that the war in Afghanistan “has been worth fighting.” In the coming months, and, should he win a second term, the coming years, Obama will have to expend political capital to convince the American public that the billions poured into South Asia are an investment in global security, not a zero-sum game that needlessly depletes already strained U.S. coffers, as so many of his own party have argued.

Making good on promises to Afghan women will be even more difficult. Right now, many female leaders, including those in the Afghan Women’s Network who have lobbied for a seat at the table at past NATO summits, have been left out of Afghanistan’s official delegation, but will take part in a “shadow summit” at Chicago’s Swissôtel. Afghan women have had to fight tooth and nail for a role in nearly every high-level gathering. Sometimes, as at the Kabul Conference, they succeeded. But most times they have not. Obama and Karzai’s strategic agreement stipulates that the “necessary outcomes of any peace and reconciliation process” follow the “Afghan Constitution, including its protection for all Afghan women and men.” But even if Kabul were to draw antigovernment forces into formal negotiations, it remains highly doubtful that the Taliban leadership would ever work in accordance with the Afghan constitution’s protection of “equal rights and duties before the law.” Recent threats to girls’ schools in Nangarhar province have hardly inspired confidence.

The fundamental issue is that many of the international actors in Afghanistan have viewed women’s rights as a pet project rather than a necessity for stability. Obama noted last week that the agreement “includes Afghan commitments to transparency and accountability, and to protect the human rights of all Afghans — men and women, boys and girls.” But exactly who would ensure that whatever Afghan government takes power following the next presidential election, which is slated for 2014, respects this rule is a mystery. And of late, Karzai has been increasingly accommodative of conservatives who wish to curb women’s mobility, in a play to end up on the right side of power when foreigners head for the exits. All of this has led Amnesty International to urge the Obama administration to “adopt an action plan for Afghan women to ensure that their rights are not traded away in the transition.”

Even the security gains that U.S. and Afghan troops have achieved since the announcement of the surge in 2009 are in jeopardy. As the Pentagon noted in April, Afghan security forces, set to peak at 352,000 this year, “are the backbone of long-term security and stability plans for Afghanistan.” Even as they have grown stronger and more capable, however, Afghan forces, according to the Pentagon’s assessment, “continue to confront challenges, including attrition, leadership deficits, and limited capabilities in staff planning, management, logistics, and procurement.” There are logistical problems, and there is a lack of medical capacity.

Recently, news reports have suggested the Pentagon is working to put a better spin on ANSF readiness, apparently in an attempt to mollify the American public and congressional overseers before the withdrawal. A report from the AP stated that the U.S. military is “under-reporting the number of times that Afghan soldiers and police open fire on American and other foreign troops.” And the Kabul-based Afghan Analyst Network recently charged international forces with “misleading the public by calling military operations ‘Afghan-led’ even in cases where NATO or U.S. forces are the only troops on the ground.” The Pentagon wants to show its Afghan military allies in the most positive light. But that will make it all the more surprising for the American public if hard-fought gains erode, territory is lost, and a security vacuum follows.

Obama gave a hopeful speech about Afghanistan filled with best-case scenarios. But the realities on the ground undermine much of what he said. Should Obama win a second term he will face a restive party, a recalcitrant Congress, and an American public that already wants little to do with Afghanistan. He will have to decide how much of his own popularity he will sacrifice to guarantee “sustainable stability” for what he has called a “war of necessity.” And he must at last discuss in detail exactly why it is so important that American forces not leave behind a power vacuum in Afghanistan — and what it will take to make this possible. Should Mitt Romney emerge victorious, keeping his party in line might prove easier, but public exhaustion would be the same. He would surely learn the lesson that Obama has: In Afghanistan, there are no easy answers or neat fixes, only complicated questions and uncomfortable tradeoffs.

Foreign Affairs

This is the season to count the blessings of  ‘positive engagement’ with the US, the hallmark of which is the opening of Ground Lines of Communication (G-LOCS, an American coinage). The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), the highest decision-making body in crisis situations, fell just short of declaring a national holiday to emphatically send the message to Washington about how relieved it was to be proposing a new beginning in bilateral relations. The DCC’s authorisation to different heads of departments to prepare the finer details of the agreement to unblock the stalled supplies to Afghanistan is being made to look like a well-considered and a painfully-arrived-at decision from a responsible state that wants to avoid the disastrous course of confrontation with a large group of very important states.

The facts of this particular matter are, however, wholly different. The entire rigmarole of holding marathon meetings and burning the midnight oil to smooth over complex policy creases had nothing to do with the 40-plus ‘important countries of the world’; nor was it a master stroke of fine diplomacy born of genius. While scripted differently, at heart it was an unconditional apology by all Pakistani decision-makers tendered to Washington for their act of closing the Nato supplies six months ago. And this apology had to be made under duress created primarily by a string of miscalculations by the country’s army high command and the political elite.

The more prominent of these miscalculations was the assumption that the hurried act of closing the gates of supplies to Nato and the US forces through Pakistan’s land would, in turn, make the world sit up and take note of the mood at the General Headquarters following Salala.

It was meant to be more than just a profound protest. In fact, Pakistan’s second miscalculation was that it perceived this as an opportunity to re-design its relations with the US in a manner that would secure Islamabad’s core interests in a deal publicly accepted to be between equals and sealed with guarantees of declared respect for Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. This was an important point to make at the time as Salala came on the heels of the OBL raid. Since the army high command could not retaliate in kind, nor could it sit back and take these repeated hits, it chose the middle way of fighting it out on the table of hard bargains with Washington.

The political elite played along this strategy, but for different reasons. A weak-kneed government had to resort to the crutches of parliament to sustain the policy of cold confrontation with Washington in the hope that the collective will of the people’s representatives would add strength to this posture and help it cut a popular deal with the US. The parliament, never a brooding forum of high-rolling intellectuals, took the mandate with open arms, stretched it according to the aspirations of the people and returned the government a document that would be hard to implement even by the strongest of countries. What was meant to be a source of strength for the government thus became its biggest weakness: the parliament’s wish list could not be turned into a command for the world to obey. Certainly, not by a government that was consumed by its power play with the judiciary.

Thus, hemmed in by gross miscalculations, the Pakistani decision-making machinery went into hasty retreat trampling on itself. The army high command started to blame the politicians for creating a mess in parliament over a fine and delicate manoeuvre to get the best deal with Washington. The civilians in power quietly began to shift responsibility towards the generals for playing populist cards and landing the government in an impossible situation, leading to the blocking of Nato supplies. An empty kitty forced further gloom and doom upon a directionless policy-making apparatus.

The saga that started after the Salala attack is a sad and worrying testimony of how matters of extreme national importance are decided. Knee-jerk reactions have replaced long-term planning in every sphere and no collective wisdom seems to inform — much less set the direction of — the debate about Pakistan’s abiding interests. In the most precarious of times, the country is in the most fickle of hands.

The Express Tribune

As America begins to pull back its troops from Afghanistan, there’s one consequence that gets little notice but is likely to have lasting impact: Pakistan is losing the best chance in its history to gain political control over all of its territory — including the warlike tribal areas along the frontier.

Pakistan has squandered the opportunity presented by having a large U.S.-led army just over the border in Afghanistan. Rather than work with the U.S. to stabilize a lawless sanctuary full of warlords and terrorists, the Pakistanis decided to play games with these outlaw groups. As a result, Pakistan and its neighbors will be less secure, probably for decades.

This is a catastrophic mistake for Pakistan. Instead of drawing the tribal areas into a nation that finally, for the first time since independence in 1947, could be integrated and unified, the Pakistani military decided to keep the ethnic pot boiling. It was a triumph of short-term thinking over long; of scheming over strategy.

America has made many blunders in Afghanistan, which will have their own consequences. But U.S. problems are modest compared to those of Pakistan, which nearly 65 years after independence still doesn’t have existential security as a nation. Like most big mistakes people make in life, this is one that Pakistan’s military leaders made with their eyes wide open.

The G-8 and NATO will hold summit meetings in the coming days, and announce the exit strategy from Afghanistan. Fortunately, President Obama is planning a gradual transition, with at least 20,000 U.S. troops remaining until 2024, if necessary, to train the Afghan army, hunt al-Qaida and steady Afghans against the danger of civil war.

But what can Western leaders say when it comes to Pakistan? Basically, the Pakistanis blew it. By playing a hedging game, they missed a moment that’s not likely to return, when a big Western army of well over 100,0000 soldiers was prepared to help them. Instead, Islamabad used the inevitability that America would be leaving eventually as an argument for creating a buffer zone that was inhabited by a murderous m{inodot}lange of the Taliban, the Haqqani network and other Pashtun warlords.

Yes, it would have been hard to bring under Pakistani law the rebellious badlands known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. I have a shelf full of books describing how the process of pacification eluded the British raj and was gingerly handed over to the new government of Pakistan like a bag of snakes. But hard is not impossible — especially when you have modern communications and transport, and the most potent army in history ready to help.

What comes through reading these old books is how long the problem has persisted. A 1901 British “Report on Waziristan and Its Tribes” lists the tribes, clans and sub-clans the British were paying off more than a century ago through their political agents rather than risk a fight with these stubborn warriors. After their disastrous Afghan wars, the British decided that payoffs made more sense than shoot-outs — a decision the Pakistanis have repeated ever since at the price of permanent insecurity.

The notion of the tribal areas as a warrior kingdom impenetrable to outsiders has a romantic “Orientalist” tone. I was disabused of it in 2009 when I met a group of younger tribal leaders who had gathered in Islamabad to tell U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke that the region needed economic development, good governance and less hanky-panky from the central government. In a move that embodied everything that’s wrong with the Pakistani approach, these brave young men were intercepted on the way home by the Inter-Services Intelligence and quizzed about why they had dared talk to the farangi.

Surely the most foolish move the Pakistanis made was to compromise with the terrorist Haqqani network, which operates from its base in Miran Shah, a few hundred yards from a Pakistani military garrison. This was like playing with a venomous cobra — something the Pakistanis seem to imagine is an essential part of regional realpolitik. No, you kill a cobra. If the ISI had been up to the task, it would have had some formidable snake-killing allies.

The Pakistanis lost a chance over the past decade to build and secure their country. It won’t come back again in this form. That’s a small problem for the U.S. and its allies, but a big problem for Pakistan. What a shame to see a wonderful nation miss its moment so completely.

INDYSTAR

Nato route had been blocked after 24 Pak soldiers were killed in Nov 26 cros-border firing.

Pakistan is preparing to open the crucial Nato supply route to Afghanistan, a top US commander based in Afghanistan has said, noting that there were signs of improvement in bilateral ties.

“There have been in the last several days, some very important signals coming out of Islamabad that there is a consideration to re-open the ground lines of communication, and we, frankly, would welcome that, we would applaud that decision,” General John Allen, commander of US and Nato forces in Afghanistan, said.

“It would, in fact, be helpful to us if the ground lines of communication were opened, not just because of what could flow into Afghanistan but what could flow out of Afghanistan,” Allen said in his address by video conference to the sixth annual 2012 Joint Warfighting Conference, in Virginia Beach, Virginia.

Allen acknowledged that the relationship between US and Pakistan have been hit after the November 26 incident in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in a cross border fire, following which Islamabad closed the crucial Nato supply route.

“I will tell you the effect of the closure of that route on the campaign has not slowed us at all. The air bridge into Afghanistan and the flow of materiel across the Northern Distribution Network were modulated in a way that continued to support the campaign in every operational respect,” Allen said.

The top US Commander said that there has been a general review by the Pakistani Parliament of relations with the United States and some very hopeful signs.

“I would say that over the next several months, we may well see, between ISAF and the Afghan national security forces and the Pakistani military, an ability to work very closely to ensure that we can coordinate operations along the border,” Allen said.

In his remarks, Gen Allen said many of the nations that are helping support the Afghan people in their fight against the Taliban will continue to help the country long after their active combat has ended.

He described how most ISAF nations are establishing their own bilateral agreements to assist the Afghan government beyond the fighting.

“We will keep our commitment to the afghan national forces beyond 2014,” Allen said of the planned end of ISAF combat operations. The bilateral relationships will ensure continued training, advising and mentoring of the Afghan force.

Ultimately, the goal is to have the Afghan army carry out all counterinsurgency operations and allow the police to focus on traditional police issues, the general offered.

“The police should be able to move from being the trailing edge of counterinsurgency to being the leading edge of law enforcement and justice,” he stated.

Business Standard

TEHRAN: Iran rejects Western pressures over its nuclear activities and will never give up its rights, Tehran’s chief nuclear negotiator said Thursday ahead of crunch talks with world powers in Baghdad next week.

“If we participate in the negotiations… it is because of our resistance (to Western powers). Thanks to our resistance, we have defended the rights of the Iranian people,” Saeed Jalili said in a speech broadcast on local television.

“The Iranian people will never give up even an iota of their rights,”Jalili added, in reference to the Islamic republic’s nuclear drive which the West suspects is masking a weapons programme. Tehran vehemently denies the charge.

After a 15 month hiatus, Iran and the P5+1 powers — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States plus Germany — held their first talks in Istanbul in mid-April, which were described as “positive.”The parties agreed to more in-depth discussions in Baghdad on May 23.

“I advise Western officials against making calculated mistakes. In Baghdad, we can negotiate for cooperation on the basis of respect for Iran’s undeniable rights,” Jalili said.

“The path chosen by our country is a path of no return. The (West) would like to block Iran’s progress in the nuclear domain, but they have failed. Iran today has become a nuclear power,” he added.

“To those who say that time is running out for dialogue, I reply: What is running out is the policy of pressuring Iran, because this strategy has not yielded the results” expected by world powers.

The United States and the European Union have tightened economic sanctions on Iran, imposing tough restrictions on its vital oil industry, to pressure it over its disputed uranium enrichment programme.

US President Barack Obama warned Iran in March that time was running out to resolve the standoff through diplomacy.

But Jalili was defiant on Thursday, insisting that sanctions and international pressure were not affecting Iran’s determination.

“Those who think they can pressure Iran with these sanctions are wrong… because the sanctions have allowed us to make progress,” he said.

He argued that the conditions imposed on Iran at talks in Geneva in 2009 for the delivery of uranium enriched to 20 percent for its Tehran research reactor had in fact forced it to produce the nuclear fuel itself.

“We told them: ‘If you do not give us the fuel, we will produce it ourselves.’ I will never forget the smiles from certain members of the P5+1.

“But in less than two years we produced the fuel, and we are using it today.” Iran currently enriches uranium to 3.5 percent and to 20 percent. The former it says is to power its Bushehr nuclear electricity plant and the latter it says is to generate medical isotopes in its Tehran research reactor.

Uranium has to be enriched to 90 per cent or above for use in an atomic bomb. Several Iranian officials have in recent weeks hinted that Tehran may under certain conditions suspend its drive of enriching uranium to the 20 per cent level.

Tehran says it wants international acceptance of its right to peaceful nuclear activities, for sanctions to be lifted and for the threat of US and Israeli military action to disappear.

DAWN.COM

Buoyed by the winds of change sweeping the region, Libyan women are eyeing a far greater role for themselves after next month’s national assembly elections.

The June 19 poll – the first since the fall of dictator Muammar Gaddafi – will see the country electing 200 candidates to the body that will draft the country’s constitution.

Recent polls in neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia have had mixed results for women, and the lessons are not lost on their Libyan counterparts.

In Egypt, parliamentary elections saw less than two per cent of the seats go to women – eight seats, compared to the 64 guaranteed to them by law. It was somewhat better in Tunisia, with 49 women getting elected.

Halloum al-Fallah, an independent candidate hopeful from the eastern city of Benghazi, said Libyan women are taking lessons from the Arab Spring in terms of how to fight for their place in politics.

“We are learning from the mistakes in Egypt and Tunisia, but also learning from what other countries are doing well,” said Fallah.

‘New journey’

New election rules for the 200 seats up for grabs have reserved 80 seats for parties and 120 for independents.

he candidate list submitted by political parties must contain an equal number of men and women – 40 seats for each – meaning that women could make up at least 20 per cent of the assembly.

There are no limits as to how many women can run as independents, so what will come of the 120 seats is also uncertain.

“The problem right now is that there is no flow of information, not even about how many women have applied to be candidates. We don’t have a system of information sharing, or who is doing what, where they are. All we know is that there are positive indications that there are many female candidates,” said Farida Allaghi, a rights activist who is coaching potential female candidates on how to debate and present their campaign platforms.

“Even if women don’t win, it’s the beginning of a new journey for women’s political participation.”

Party politics

Given that political parties need women on their ballots in order to be eligible for the elections, there is a possibility that parties might approach women who will simply follow the fold rather than push to elevate the status of women in Libya.

“Some political parties will put women on the ballot to get more votes or to be accepted. If I’m elected, I will have to do my bit to motivate them to contribute and to be ambitious,” said Salma Ahmed Abu-Zadah, a legal consultant to the military council and potential candidate for Free Democratic Bloc Party, adding that as long as there are women in the assembly, they will work to ensure women’s rights are included in the constitution.

“Women’s role now is different than it was before, when [Gaddafi] used women to fill seats, to use them for his image… contributing to his regime.”

The general vibe among women, many of whom found a new place in the community in the course of the revolution, is one of optimism.

Ayshe Rouemi, who hopes to be a candidate for the United for the Nation party, said that since the revolution, “when the chains and shackles were broken”, Libyan women have been confident that they will be included in the country’s power structure.

“Political parties are looking for women now and women can refuse their offers if we are not happy with their place – we can insist that they be put on the top of the ballot,” said Rouemi.

“Just the idea [of] them looking for women for fear of being rejected without us is a good sign.”

The changed circumstances have thrown open new opportunities for many.

Nourah Ali Salem El-Hebashi, from Tarhouna – 100km south of Tripoli – applied to run as an independent candidate.

“I am the only person to be nominated to be a candidate from my community – they encouraged me to run,” said Hebashi.

Lingering doubts

There are concerns, however, that a single party, possibly the Muslim Brotherhood, will execute a power-grab as in Egypt, sidelining women.

“In Libya, the only way you’re going to get rights is through religion,” said Alaa Murabit, the founder of the Voice of Libyan Women, a women’s empowerment and development NGO in Libya.

Murabit’s is one of the groups helping women realise their political aspirations by organising events that include workshops with female politicians from other countries as speakers.

One of the Libyan women on the list of speakers of the group’s event earlier this week was Majda Fallah, a member of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s shura council and head of the department of combating diabetes and obesity at the national centre for disease control.

“We want women to participate, and for her participation in a political party to be a real one and a true one, and not to just as a picture, so to speak, or someone who has no effective role,” said Fallah.

“The right understanding of Islam was absent for a while and we want to revive the right understanding of Islam – that women have the right to participate in aspects of life.”

Murabit said Fallah’s message was very important as it countered the idea that Muslim women getting involved in politics risked “all hellfire”.

Challenges

Fouad Hamdan, who is coaching some of the women who have applied for candidacy on how to effectively campaign, said he believes the women have what it takes to win.

“All of these women up there, they can do… and just for your information all of them [the potential ones attending his workshop] have been asked by men to become candidates… because Libyan men are not so retarded as many think they are. On the contrary, they are much more relaxed and open about women taking such a position in society.”

He said that there are exceptions, and that women will no doubt face some challenges in Libya, which is “a conservative society after all”.

“Let me start with the challenges all of them will have, men and women, because that’s the main problem. None of them in this country has political experience, experience in speaking to the media, experience in debating, discussing and listening without freaking out and becoming emotional,” said Hamdan.

“It is basically starting from zero… it’s learning by suffering, but you know, I envy them. It’s so beautiful. It’s so pure.”

Aljazeera

The Indian government removed a major stumbling block in completing an intra-continent gas supply line, after its cabinet approved a deal to buy natural gas from Turkmenistan via the $7.6 billion pipeline which will pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan, reports said on Thursday.

The cabinet approved the signing of the Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement as well as the payment of a transit fee to Afghanistan and Pakistan for allowing the pipeline to pass through their territory, a Press Information Bureau of India press release read.

The 1,735-kilometre (1,078-mile) pipeline is likely to be operational by 2016, the Press Trust of India said, quoting a government official.

The source of the gas is the South Yoiotan Osman field, recently renamed Galkynysh, which has been certified by a reputed international consultant to be holding proven recoverable gas reserves of 16 trillion cubic metres, the release said.

Turkmenistan has the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves and energy-hungry India and Pakistan are both eager to tap this source.

The announcement comes after New Delhi said this week it would cut purchases of Iranian oil by 11 per cent following US pressure to isolate the Islamic republic over its disputed nuclear programme. Iranian oil is one of the main fuel resources for the billion-strong population India.

Washington favours the Turkmenistan pipeline and has pressured both India and Pakistan to hold off on a pipeline deal with Tehran.

Energy-scarce India, which imports four-fifths of its crude, says it shares the US anti-nuclear proliferation goals but it views Iran as an important source of oil to feed its economy’s fast-growing needs.

The Express Tribune

For the most part Americans and the World believe Pakistan has fallen no short of treacherous in the ‘War on terror’ that started eleven years ago. Islamabad’s so-called ‘shady tactics’ have given her biggest ally cold feet, time and again. With aid cuts and unilateral attacks Washington has been able to step on dependent Pakistan’s fragile self esteem by conveying crisply “who’s boss”. More recently an American journalist interviewed Prime Minister Gilani, confirming the tone of this asymmetrical partnership. Gilani, a controversial figure back home, who’s Premiership itself is criticized and rejected over the infamous ‘Contempt of Court’ case, was pushed into the corner of shame, reminded of his vulnerable position and ‘dysfunctionality’ of the society he represents.

When the Afghan war of 2001 started, Musharraf’s government was told “You’re either with us or against us”. The only option at that point was too join the anti-terrorism bandwagon. Then, like the 1980s, Pakistan was a critical ally, crucial to the success of the war. This positive image however has deteriorated. From the most vital ally Pakistan has depreciated to an enemy, labeled a hypocrite and more frequently a traitor, in not so many words. Pakistan’s relationship with the US has been unpredictable since 1947; however at such a crucial point in history, US suspicion is perhaps the last delicacy Pakistan needs on her platter.

The first allegation against Pakistan is support for the enemy: the Islamist Pashtuns, the Taliban. Pakistan is believed to prolong the war by sheltering and supporting terrorists who fight NATO forces, prolonging the war and minting billions in the process. This belief was solidified when the US found Osama bin Laden hiding in a house in Abbotabad, safely near the army’s training headquarters. Pakistan’s Sovereignty was in jeopardy after the incident (as the strike was unilateral, without any authorization from Pakistan Army or political establishment), but capturing OBL re-enforced the conviction that Pakistan had been harboring the terrorist all along.

Secondly, the ISI was accused of maintaining links with the ‘Haqqani’ network. Once the US’s blue eyed boy, like the Taliban, this group’s links with Pak Army made the US feel deceived and insecure. The icing on the cake however was the mass jail break that occurred on 15 April 2012. Four hundred inmates were released, and just walked out of the prison like victors, heroes, not stopped by the Army or prison security. The perpetrators of violence in these tribal regions, the Pakistani Taliban, are liable for the deaths of more than three thousand army personnel since the operation started in 2007.

While Pakistan continues to draw suspicion, the US has created mediums of combating enemies that make her less dependent on deceitful Pakistan. One of these is drone warfare. Responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians, and lifelong disabilities of many more, (in Pakistan) drones have become the target of a global civil society that has been exposed to the magnitude of war crimes committed by them. Even though the Pakistan government, under civilian pressure halted drone strikes successfully for a month after the Salala attack, they resumed without authorization, and have continued to occur since.

The Salala check post attack, of 26 November 2011, was a direct assault on Pakistan’s Sovereignty. Yet to obtain an apology for the lives of twenty five troops, including an officer and Captain, the incident has left Pakistan scarred. The immediate aftermath was closure of NATO supply route (re-opening 18 May 2012), halt on drone strikes (that only lasted a month) and evacuation of the Shamsi airbase near Jacobabad. The unprovoked attack on Pakistani troops has escalated anti-Americanism.

With differences escalating between Islamabad and Washington, recent incidents prove that Washington has perpetually resorted to the ‘stick’. The two continue to talk at each other. Running out of patience and facing a dearth of common motives, the US and Pakistan are both trying to get the most out of this flimsy partnership, without bringing their differences on the table. Instead they have resorted to coercion. Where Islamabad and ISI like to remind Washington of their regional ‘edge’, the latter has used media and other domestic problems as excuses to step on Pakistan’s credibility. For Western media Pakistan has been playing a “double game” with the US. Are Pakistanis living in a bubble; in absolute denial of the treacherous actions of their intelligence forces and political establishment? What is this double game that Pakistan has been accused of playing?

The crux of the problem is straightforward. For the US this decade long war’s success lies in the sustainability of the institutions they have created and upheld. The Karzai government suits the attainment of imperial agendas. Its loyalties lie with the West, its creator. The liberal face of Afghanistan must enjoy the support of US allies, like Pakistan. However this US plot falters because the very ‘Islamist Pashtuns’ they have spent trillions on defeating remain the most powerful political group even today. Pakistan’s prediction is that as soon as the US leaves, there will be political unrest, and the Islamist Pashtuns are most likely to secure the next government. Without the safety nets and American presence, the Karzai government is highly unlikely to live on.

Pakistan wants regional stability more than anything else. However it has suffered while pursuing US ideology and objectives in the first Afghan war that drove the Soviets out. A massive victory for the West, the Afghan war has left millions of refugees, drugs, Kalashnikovs and extremism in the country. The Pakistan Army’s ‘Jihadi’ mindset was a product of her interaction with Afghan brothers. The porous North West border, loyalties based on ethnicity, and a large Pashtun population put Pakistan in a susceptible position. We created the Taliban because the CIA wanted them; we embraced an ‘Islamic ideology’ that created the synergy to intimidate and defeat the Soviets. Once we joined hands and minds with them, they started hating on the West, and now, we must fight them.

The US’s expectations from Pakistan are unreasonable. America’s tunnel vision policies, that only aim to justify war amidst re-election, fail to factor in the many strings that are attached to Pakistan’s participation. However, the ground reality suggests that it is in Pakistan’s interest to not throw all her eggs in one basket (the Karzai government), and instead act to secure her own regional interests.

Tacstrat Analysis
By Zoon Ahmad Khan

The Khyber Pakht-unkhwa government on Wednesday approved the suspension of the officials who were found negligent by the inquiry committee in averting the Bannu jailbreak.

The suspended officials included Commissioner Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa inspector general of prisons, district police officer of Bannu and the political agent of North Waziristan.Briefing reporters after the cabinet meeting here, provincial Minister for Information Mian Iftikhar Hussain said officials of various government departments had been made officers on special duty (OSDs) and would be suspended by the respective departments on Thursday.

The cabinet meeting was convened with a one-point agenda to discuss the report presented by the inquiry committee about the Bannu jailbreak that took place on April 15. The Taliban had claimed responsibility for the jailbreak to secure release of their men, including Adnan Rasheed, a key suspect in the attack on former president General Pervez Musharraf. The militants recently released the footage of the jailbreak that showed the prisoners escaping from the Bannu prison after the attack.

The officials who have been made OSDs include former commissioner Bannu Abdullah Mahsud, IG Prisons Arshad Majeed, AIG Shah Salman, Political Agent North Waziristan Mohammad Yahya, District Officer FC (Frontier Constabulary) Bannu Sharbat Khan Afridi, District Officer FC Daryuba, Haji Raza Khan, DCO Bannu Zahir Shah and Political Agent FR Bannu Daftar Khan. Others include Political Tehsildar Samiullah Khan, AD Admin Syed Fazl Rahim, Superintendent Judicial Rizwan, ex-superintendent Bannu Prison Usman Ali, Zahir, assistant superintendent Bannu jail Jalat Khan, RPO Bannu DIG Iftikhar Khan, DPO Bannu Gul Syed Khan, SP Frontier Reserve Police Amanullah Khan, DSP Inayat Ali Khan, DSP Headquarters Mohammad Shafi, SHOs Mohammad Jalil, Mir Saeed and Shabbir Hussain, operators of Commissioner Office Bannu, Section Officer Home Department Mohammad Ghulam and all those officials who were deployed at the relevant police stations and checkposts at the time of the jail attack.

Mian Iftikhar said Adnan Rasheed who convicted in the Musharraf murder attempt case had been illegally transferred from Punjab to a prison in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He added that Adnan Rasheed was later shifted to the Bannu Central Prison for which a section officer at the provincial Home Department had issued the no-objection certificate without taking his high-ups into confidence.

The minister asked the Punjab government to probe the matter and punish the officials found guilty. He added though the intelligence agencies had feared such attack some four months back and informed the relevant quarters in advance, the warning was not taken seriously.

To a question, Mian Iftikhar said the Pakistan Army was carrying out investigation into the Bannu jailbreak and would extend cooperation to the provincial government in this regard. He said the cabinet also approved the construction of separate prisons for militants and criminals in the province. He said the Bannu prison was vulnerable to such attacks due to its proximity to the tribal areas. The minister said that majority of the escaped prisoners had been rearrested while some surrendered voluntarily.

The News